Ke Feng

Bio

I obtained my Ph.D. degree in Accounting from the Department of Accounting and Business Analytics at the University of Alberta. I am currently on the job market.

My research focuses on corporate governance and shareholder voting, particularly proxy advisory firms as information intermediaries. I am interested in their influence on institutional investors’ information acquisition strategies, on managers’ proxy statement setting, and on how investors interpret proxy advisors’ reports.

I am a Chartered Professional Accountant in Ontario, Canada, and a Licensed Certified Public Accountant in Illinois, U.S.A.

Contact

Email: kfeng2 [ at ] ualberta [ dot ] ca
Phone: +1 (780) 492-5816
Address: Business PhD Program Office
Room 2-24 Business Building
University of Alberta
Edmonton, AB T6G 2R6
Canada

Working Papers

Proxy Advisory Firms Induce Investors To Become Informed, Occasionally

Current Version: April 2025

Abstract (click to expand): This paper studies shareholder voting with third-party advice. Specifically, I investigate whether shareholders make more informed voting decisions after having received a proxy advisory firm's report. I find that the proxy advisor enters the market if its report can encourage supplemental research. This finding challenges the current orthodoxy, which is that shareholders use the proxy advisor's report as a substitute for independent research. Taking the proxy advisor's strategic entry decision leads to the opposite conclusion: the proxy advisor's report is complementary to independent research.

SSRN

Disclosure Volume

(with Jack Stecher)

Current Version: April 2025

Abstract (click to expand): We contribute to the voluntary disclosure literature by investigating the consequences of disclosure volume. Focusing on a voting setting, we study whether a manager can manipulate shareholders by strategically choosing the number of unbiased signals to release publicly before a shareholders' meeting. This choice of volume affects voting because, in equilibrium, shareholders vote strategically, taking into consideration both their own information and what others must know in order for their votes to be decisive. Instead of biasing the released information, the manager takes advantage of how the shareholders' strategic voting incentives lead them to bias their own inferences.

SSRN

Teaching

Winter 2024:
ACCTG 456: Assurance on Financial Information

Fall 2021:
ACCTG 432: Financial Statement Analysis

Website: I built this website based on the code from Prof. Gautam Rao, which you can find at his GitHub repository.